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1 In the last years, by virtue of its record of “double digit” GDP growth, Ethiopia has been
celebrated among the “African lions” and the “emerging African countries” (McKinsey,
2010; Radelet, 2010). Official statistics set the country on track to meet the ambitious
“Growth and Transformation Plan” (GTP), which aims to reach the middle-income status
by 2025 (FDRE, 2010). The peculiarity of the Ethiopian case lies in the fact that, unlike
other  emerging  African  countries  with  similar  post-revolutionary  trajectories,  the
process  of  economic  growth  is  not  driven  by  natural  resources  extraction.  On  the
contrary,  the  rise  of  Ethiopian  GDP  in  the  last  years  results  from  public  capital
investments  in infrastructures  and from the improvement of  the productivity in the
agriculture and manufacturing sectors. These processes have been upheld by emulating
the Asian model of the developmental state (Clapham, 2006), implying a key role for the
central  government  in  driving  and  stimulating  the  national  economy,  as  explicitly
theorised by the former PM Meles Zenawi (Zenawi, 2012).
2 One of the pillars of such development strategy consists in agricultural commercialisation
implying significant processes of rescaling and glocalisation (Swyngedouw, 2004). In the
GTP the Ethiopian government operated a radical shift in its development strategies: the
traditional focus on household agriculture to achieve national food security has become a
secondary,  although not marginal,  objective.  This is  to embrace market liberalisation
strategies  to  create  wealth  and  employment  through  the  attraction  of  foreign
investments on land, the promotion of micro and small enterprises, as well as of market
led agricultural production.
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3 The  article  addresses  the  consequences  of  agrarian  transformations  in  terms  of
(re)configuration  and  (re)negotiation  of  spaces  and  power  in  the  process  of  state
formation in contemporary Ethiopia. In doing so, we adopt the notion of “Thermidorian
situation”,  developed by Jean-François Bayart as a paradigm to analyse the historical
trajectories of post-revolutionary elites consolidating their power in the context of the
neoliberal  global  economy  through  selective  and  original  strategies  of  political  and
economic liberalisation (Bayart, 2008).
4 This  perspective  elucidates  the  main  argument  of  the  article,  i.e. the  inherent
contradiction of the agrarian policies in contemporary Ethiopia.  On the one side,  the
economic liberalisation and the adoption of market oriented strategies entails processes
of rescaling that open up spaces for international flows, for the private sector and for
local economic actors. On the other side, the revolutionary ideology and ethos that still
animate the Ethiopian ruling class push for a proactive role by the central government in
promoting, driving and controlling such processes, with the goals of ensuring compliance
to  its  development  vision  and  of  avoiding  the  emergence  of  political  and  economic
competitors in gaining legitimacy and support among the population through economic
and  development  initiatives.  This  contradiction  results  in  ambiguous  dynamics  of
reconfiguration of state intervention in the economy and in the rural spaces, as well as in
the  on-going  negotiation and mediation between the  expanding  state  apparatus  and
farmers’ strategies and aspirations in terms of development and economic success.
5 In order to develop such analysis, the first section of the article applies the Thermidorian
paradigm to the analysis of historical and contemporary Ethiopia. The second section
analyses  the  transformation  introduced  by  the  new  strategy  of  agricultural
commercialization: the reforms of agricultural extensions, the emphasis on agricultural
cooperatives,  micro-finance  institutions  (MFIs),  and  agricultural  micro  and  small
enterprises (MSEs). The third section discusses the main tensions of the project for rural
transformation by tracing its political, historical and ideological roots back to the 1975
land  reform.  Particular  attention  is  paid  to  the  post-2001  conjuncture  in  which  the
tensions  of  the  contemporary  project  of  rural  transformation  became  much  more
apparent.1 The conclusion analyses the main tensions between the developmental state
and economic liberalization within agrarian transformations,  highlighting patterns of
(re)configuration and (re)negotiation of spaces and power and that apply to the broader
process of state formation in contemporary “glocal” Ethiopia. 
 
Thermidor in Ethiopia
6 In the historical experience of the French Revolution, Thermidor marks the attempt by
the revolutionary elite “to get out from the Terror” (Baczko, 2013), transforming itself
into  ruling  class  through  the  institutionalisation  of  the  revolutionary  achievements
under  the  Republic,  without  abandoning  their  used  revolutionary  imaginary  and
vocabulary.  This  experience  inspires  the  Thermidorian  paradigm developed  by  Jean-
François  Bayart  to  analyse  the  historical  trajectory  of  post-revolutionary  elites  with
Marxist  or  socialist  background,  professionalising  into  ruling  classes  at  the  time  of
neoliberal  globalisation,  upholding  their  power  and accumulating  resources  through
selective and original strategies of economic liberalisation (Bayart, 2008).
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7 This paradigm seems particularly meaningful to grasp the very nature of the process of
state formation in contemporary Ethiopia. We refer to the notion of state formation as
developed by Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale namely “the historical process, mainly
unconscious  and  contradictory,  of  conflicts,  negotiation  and  compromises  between
different groups” (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992, p. 5) that occurs within - and ultimately
shapes - the explicit institutional strategies of state building promoted by governments’
elites. 
8 The Thermidorian paradigm shares with other analysis of post-revolutionary regimes two
elements.  First,  the  understanding  of  these  regimes  through  the  analysis  of  the
concatenation of their historical trajectories - the longue durée - with the intimate and
personal  experience  of  the  former  fighters  (Clapham,  2012).  Second,  the  attention
devoted  to  the  political,  cultural  and  practical  factors  influencing  the  processes  of
institutionalisation  of  former  guerrilla  movement  into  political  parties  and  their
legitimacy (De Zeeuw, 2007; Podder, 2014).
9 However,  in  respect  to  these  other  approaches  we  just  referred  to,  we  retain  two
elements that in our view constitute the added value of the Thermidorian paradigm in
understanding the Ethiopian case. First, the Thermidorian paradigm does not assess the
post-revolutionary  regimes  against  the  normative  approach  of  “the  transition  to
democracy”; on the contrary it allows highlighting the peculiarity of “a political economy
not  reducible  to  the  neo-liberal  cadre”  (Bayart,  2008,  p. 53,  our  translation)  and the
persistence  of  the  “veil  of  ideology”  (ibid,  p. 7).  Second,  the  Thermidorian  paradigm
situates the analysis of the post-revolutionary political institutions by emphasising their
broader  relationship  with  the  society.  In  this  respect,  combining  the  Thermidorian
paradigm with the notions of “state rescaling” and “glocalisation” (Swyngedouw 2004)
allows situating the post-revolutionary political institutions also at different scales – a
focus developed in the analysis of case studies such as Cambodia (Bayart, 2008) but not
explicitly addressed in the theoretical paradigm.
10 The  process  of  state  building  in  contemporary  Ethiopia  has  been  shaped  by  the
generation  of  fighters  of  the  Tigray  People  Liberation  Front  (TPLF)  that  since  1991,
following the overthrown of the military regime of the Derg, has become the oligarchy
leading  the  ruling  coalition  of  the  Ethiopian  People  Revolutionary  Democratic  Front
(EPRDF).  The  TPLF  revolutionary  experience  has  been  institutionalised  in  the  1995
Constitution, restructuring Ethiopia in a federal and decentralised republic in the name
of  the  right  to  self-determination  of  the  “nations,  nationalities  and  peoples”  of  the
country (Turton, 2006). 
11 The insertion of  post-revolutionary  Ethiopia  in  the neoliberal  globalisation has  been
shaped by a selective adhesion to the model of the liberal democracy and free market.
The EPRDF distanced itself from liberal democracy, by recalling the revolutionary myth
through  the  official  adoption  of  the  “ambiguous  doctrine”  (Bach,  2011,  p. 641)  of
“revolutionary - abyotawi in Amharic - democracy”, hybridising the liberal reforms such
us multi-party elections with the political repertoire of the revolutionary front inspired
by Marxism, Leninism and Maoism, as well as by ethno-regional ideology. In the field of
economic policy, while dismantling the Derg’s system of soviet style planned economy,
the  EPRDF  openly  rejected  the  structural  adjustments  programmes  and  the
macroeconomic policies promoted by the International Financial Institutions, adopting
alternative “largely self-determined policies”, as described by Joseph Stigltiz, at the time
involved in the negotiation on behalf of the World Bank (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 30). Thus the
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Ethiopian government holds a main role or a monopolistic  position in key economic
sectors  like  finance,  telecommunication  and  energy,  and  retains  control  of  the
agricultural  inputs  (land,  fertilisers,  credit).  In  this  context,  the  Thermidorian  elite
consolidates its power by strategies of resources accumulation and control through the
straddling of positions within the State administration, the party structure, the NGOs or
enterprises  affiliated  to  the  EPRDF,  and  the  microfinance  and  other  development
institutions controlled by the government.
12 Three  peculiarities  of  the  Ethiopian  Thermidor  stem  from  the  specificities  of  the
country’s  historical  trajectory.  First,  the  Ethiopian  Thermidor  results  from  the
overlapping of two different revolutionary moments: the one initiated by the Derg, and
the one led by the TPLF and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).2 These two
revolutions ignited in reaction to the same contradictions of Imperial Ethiopia: on one
side the social question related to the issue of land ownership; on the other side the
national question, namely the asymmetrical relations between Ethiopia’s different ethnic
groups. These two questions are strictly correlated. The Derg and the TPLF offered similar
answers to the former but diverging to the latter, with TPLF opting for a more radical
deconcentration of  State institutions at  the local  level.  This  entails  both elements of
rupture and continuity between the two regimes.
13 Second,  the TPLF revolution has  been achieved trough a  military conquest  of  power
deeply influencing the EPRDF political repertoire. During the fourteen years long armed
struggle,  the  TPLF successfully  tested strategies  of  peasants  mobilisation inspired by
Leninist and Maoist doctrines. The TPLF acted as vanguard of the rural masses, matching
military  and political  encadrement  with the  provision of  basic  social  services  in  the
liberated areas of  Tigray,  thus guaranteeing the political  legitimacy and the material
support to its struggle. In the Ethiopian Thermidor, these strategies have been hybridised
with  the  technical  register  of  the  good  governance  and  the  fight  against  poverty
promoted by the international development apparatus, and they have been reproduced
through the “capacity building” of the hierarchical state machinery and bureaucratic
structures inherited from the previous regimes.  This  process  translates in a  political
project matching hegemony and coercion, the provision of basic social services and the
authoritarian exercise  of  political  power.  The  EPRDF revolutionary  ethos  inspire  the
encadrement of women, youth, and peasants in “development armies” or in the selection
of “model villages” and “model farmers” in order to ensure the rigorous implementation
of its development policies throughout the country (Lefort, 2012; Seegers et al., 2009).
14 Third, the polymorphic nature of the revolution contributes to the heterogeneity and
internal plurality within the Thermidorian ruling class. While Tigray experienced a real
mass revolution—with the whole population involved in the armed struggle (Young, 2006)
—in the rest of the country, particularly in its southern marches and peripheral areas, the
liberation from the Derg was featured by a rather passive revolution, in Gramsci’s terms
(Gramsci, 1975), with the TPLF co-opting existing local elites or creating new ones at the
end of the war (Vaughan, 2006). Consequently, the reference to the liberation struggles
allows  various  degrees  of  political  legitimation  in  different  Ethiopian  regions  and
peripheries,  where the revolutionary myth does not enjoy the same level  of  cultural
significance  as  it  does  in  Tigray  and  partially  in  Amhara.  Thus,  at  local  level  post-
revolutionary  development  policies  mentioned  above  are  shaped  by  processes  of
negotiation, selected adhesion, or resistance by local elites and ordinary people.
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15 These features contribute to one of the main contradiction of the Ethiopian Thermidor.
On one side, the Thermidorian elite sets as its main mission transforming of the country
into a mature capitalist system, opening up the economy and the society and implicitly
acknowledging the potentialities of economic liberalisation and the role of the private
sector. On the other side, the EPRDF—particularly the TPLF oligarchy leading the party
coalition—does not fully dismiss the revolutionary ethos and ideology of the political
vanguard. Consequently, while in principle acknowledging “society’s independence and
inertia” (Bayart,  2008)—for instance through ethnic federalism and decentralisation—
they seek to control, orient and transform the society according to their ideology and
revolutionary  plan,  preventing  the  emergence  of  potential  political  and  economic
competitors.  These  contradictions  can  be  best  seen  by  looking  in  particular  at  the
processes of rescaling and glocalisation engendered by EPRDF policies of land reform,
agricultural commercialisation and market liberalisation in rural areas.
 
Commercialisation of Smallholder Agriculture in West
Arsi: Cooperatives, Micro-Finance Institutions, and
Enterprises
16 Observations are conducted during several fieldwork visits since 2009 in the West Arsi
Zone of  Oromiya Region.  While  some degree of  generalisation might  apply,  different
Regions—sometimes even different Districts—have quite diverse policies especially when
it comes to implementation. Some of the details presented here have therefore to be
considered as contextual and not directly applicable to other Ethiopian contexts.
17 In recent years, agricultural commercialisation has become one of the most important
facets of the government strategy for rural transformation (GTP, 2010), and has entailed
the  promotion  of  large-scale  investments  by  public  and  private  actors,  as  well  as
commercialised  smallholders.  While  the  former  has  received  much  international
attention, the support to commercialised smallholders is by far central to the notion of
Thermidorian situation, as it characterises the processes through which the elite attempt
to institutionalize its role of dominant class in the rural areas by means of a selective and
partial process of economic liberalization. Thus, support to commercial smallholders is
remarkable for at least two additional reasons. First, as noted by Lefort (2012, p. 682),
detaching farmers from commercialisation in order to prevent the accumulation of rents
was an overriding political priority of the EPRDF-led government since it first came to
power in the 1990s.  Support  to commercial  smallholders constitutes  by far  the most
remarkable shift in the government land policy since the 1970s, and has entailed the
reformulation of agricultural extensions towards the objectives of economic efficiency
and the creation of an environment suitable for market expansion. Second, the support to
better-off farmers by means of a strong state intervention is associated with an intense
process of institution building at the grassroots level, as well as with the reconfiguration
of  institutions  previously  engaged  in  the  support  of  the  smallholder  sector  as  a
“homogenous  entity”  towards  a  business  model.  These  transformations  reflect
interventions in the field of microfinance, the cooperative system, and the establishment
of micro and small enterprises.
18 Microfinance has become one of the main government’s political priorities to promote
fast  commercialisation.3 Through  the  Micro-Financing  Business  Proclamation  No.
Thermidor in Ethiopia? Agrarian Transformations between Economic Liberalizati...
EchoGéo, 31 | 2015
5
626/2009,  the  federal  and  regional  governments  have  intensified  efforts  to  increase
financial services for smallholder farmers and micro and small enterprises (IFAD, 2009).
MFIs  are  closely  associated  with  the  regional  governments,  which  are  majority
shareholders, as well as the ruling party, and they are a central aspect of the government
strategy to  mobilize  the  rural  population.4 The reformulation of  credit  and financial
services  to  the  farmers  is  also  evident  in  some  recent  trends  characterizing  the
cooperative system.5 Agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia are formally autonomous, but
the local  administrative structure/party system complex normally exercises power in
cooperatives’  formation  and  their  day-to-day  activities  (Rahmato,  2002).  While  this
interference is not uniform across the country, farmers in West Arsi normally identify
cooperatives and MFIs directly with the government.
19 While until recently the mobilization of the smallholders and endowment of agricultural
inputs  were  the  two  main  functions  of  agricultural  cooperatives,  the  Agricultural
Cooperatives  Sector  Development  Strategy  2012-2016  places  agricultural
commercialisation at the centre of the cooperative system. Under the new strategy, the
cooperatives’ “primary purpose is increasing member producers’ production and incomes
by helping better link with finance, agricultural inputs, information, and output markets”
(FDRE, 2012, p. 9). In remarking the limited involvement in output marketing, the long-
term strategic  direction for  sustaining agricultural  commercialisation is  enabling the
cooperatives to provide two types of marketing services:  “selling output on behalf of
farmers using robust market information, and having systematic marketing relationships
with reliable demand sources” (FDRE, 2012, p. 24). Yet, in order to provide more efficient
services to the farmers, strengthening input distribution and marketed output, access to
finance  is  to  develop the  capacity  of  the  cooperative  sector  (FDRE,  2012,  p. 51).  The
document expresses the government’s commitment to expand the mandate of MFIs and
Rural Saving and Credit Cooperatives (RUSACCOs), “to serve the role of a semi-dedicated
financing institution for the cooperatives sector” (FDRE, 2012, p. 53). In West Arsi, the
new vision on the cooperative sector and the emphasis on MFIs generated two important
transformations.
20 The first transformation concerns the function of MFIs and agricultural cooperatives.
Local officials explain that until 2010-11 MFIs and agricultural cooperatives’ main task
was  providing  credit  for  modern agricultural  inputs  (fertilisers  and improved seeds)
through  credit  lines  guaranteed  by  the  budget  of  the  regional  government.  This
generated  dysfunctions  both  in  terms  of  mismanagement  and  non-recovery.  More
recently, side by side with the diversification of the lines of credit provision, agricultural
inputs are no longer given 100% credit and farmers are required to pay cash for seeds and
fertilisers. While many farmers in West Arsi complain about this new system, another
recent  phenomenon  is  that  the  needs  assessment,  and  distribution  of  inputs  and
fertilisers, is channelled through the recently established “1 to 5 networks” (shanee in
Oromiya). These are networks of 6 farmers where one is the “model farmer”, in charge of
assisting  the  other  five  with  input  provisions,  introduction  to  new  agricultural
techniques. Model farmers are linked to the ruling party structure (Lefort, 2012). Also in
West Arsi the majority of the model farmers are party members, and their appointment is
approved by the Development Agent of the district agricultural office (ARDO). While no
formal document discusses their functions in details, it seems that one is channelling
credit from MFIs and agricultural cooperatives to the individual farmers, as a way to
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improve the structural efficiency of input delivery and, at the same time, allowing the
local administrative structures, and ultimately the ruling party, to control such process.
21 The second transformation can be  described  as  a  new emphasis  with  “saving  first”.
Assisting and providing farmers with incentives to form savings groups is among the top
priorities  behind  the  strategy  of  smallholders’  commercialisation.  In  West  Arsi  this
entailed the reformulation and extension of RUSACCOs throughout the countryside. As
explained by the Cooperative Desk of the Zone, the new priority is creating stronger
linkages between agricultural cooperatives and RUSACCOs, as a way to assist the former
“to store post-harvest income for input purchasing the following season”. This is aimed
to fill the gap in poor areas where access to financial institutions is limited and, in the
long run, developing tools to “incentivise savings and scale up innovative instruments
such as weather insurance” (FDRE, 2012, p. 20). Extension of RUSACCOs in West Arsi was
accompanied by the delocalisation of stores for agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilisers),
which since 2012 were established with the ratio of one in every four kebeles. Agricultural
cooperatives are required to save at least 30 % of their net income in the Commercial
Bank of Ethiopia.
22 The relationship between “saving first” and commercialisation of smallholder agriculture
becomes  even  more  significant  when  it  comes  to  some  recent  trends  seeing  the
promotion of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in the field of agriculture. This sector
has been a priority of the government since the Issuance of National Micro and Small
Enterprises  Strategy  in  1997  and  the  establishment  of  the  Federal  Micro  and  Small
Enterprises Development Agency. Their development is seen as an important instrument
to create a productive and dynamic private sector, creating long-term jobs, and providing
the basis for medium and large export-oriented enterprises. MSEs are supported through
infrastructural and financial facilities, trainings, and supply of raw materials (Ageba and
Ameha, 2004).
23 However, more recently MSEs have been actively promoted in the agricultural sector.
Their emergence must therefore be contextualised with the new priority of agricultural
commercialisation,6 and today MSEs offices have been established at regional, zone, and
wereda levels. The zone MSEs officer for West Arsi explains that enterprises are meant to
create new jobs in the rural areas, particularly among landless youth and women. They
are  aimed  at  reducing  poverty  through  the  creation  of  businesses  both  in  and  out
agriculture. Start-ups can be established with no capital and by presenting business plans
to MFIs, most notably the OCSSCO. The enterprise can be formed if the promotion office
considers the business of the start-up “successful”. At this stage members of the “micro”
enterprise have to provide for 20 % of the initial capital, while are allowed to demand for
up to 80 % credit from MFIs. “Micro” enterprises possess a capital of up to 50000 ETB and
employ between 5 and 30 workers; beyond that they “graduate” and achieve the status of
“small  enterprise”.  MSEs are required to save in a bank account 20 % of their profit,
whose re-investment has then to be negotiated with the promotion office and the MFI
providing the initial loan. Agricultural MSEs in West Arsi have to fit one of the sub-sector
priorities  identified  by  the  zone  promotion  office.  These  include  horticulture,  cattle
fattening,  animal  feedstock  production,  irrigated  agriculture,  bee  keeping,  and
afforestation. One important aspect of the current development of MSEs is that they can
demand the allocation of land when this is required to discharge their activities. Requests
are submitted to the wereda MSEs office that, in collaboration with the ARDO, is in charge
of  allocating  plots  from  the  wereda  “Land  Bank”.  In  Siraro  wereda this  for  instance
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entailed the redistribution of previously communal land in Damine kebele to several MSEs
for  irrigated  horticulture.  This  kebele  is  located  on  the  bank  of  Bilate  River  and  is
particularly  suitable  for  irrigated  crop  production.  While  the  kebele  leader  received
complaints from herders previously using this communal land for pasture, he noted that
this is the only way for landless youth to access to land and starting new businesses that
can leverage the local economy.
24 It is still too early to assess the impacts of these reforms, however it seems clear enough
that they are likely to entail  profound transformations in rural Ethiopia.  While some
farmers will benefit from increased commercialisation—by getting land through rental
arrangements or support from MFIs, and by their relative position vis-à-vis local power—
social  stratification  is  normally  associated  to  increased  inequalities  reproducing
marginality  and  ultimately  poverty.  In  the  final  part  of  this  article,  our  purpose  is
reconstructing  the  background  to  the  current  relationship  between  agrarian
transformation  and  state  formation,  and  contextualising  the  current  Thermidorian
situation in the longer view.
 
Agrarian Transformation and State formation in
Ethiopia
25 The question of land has always been central to the Ethiopian project of state formation
(Markakis, 2011). During the Imperial period (up to 1974) the provision of land grants to
the military was the main mechanism through which the Abyssinian empire secured the
control over the southern, western and eastern peripheries of the country. While this
gave rise to a deeply exploitative system of landlord-tenant relations, the legacy of this
controversial history of domination culminating in the subjugation of the societies over
time incorporated into the Empire  is  still  today one of  the main facets  of  what  the
historiography  defines  as  the  Ethiopian  “national  question” (Turton,  2006).  In  the
Imperial period this was reflected in a hierarchical system of distribution of political
power  along  the  lines  of  centre/periphery  relations,  at  the  heart  of  which  lay  the
question of land redistribution. This question was partly fulfilled by the 1974 revolution,
when the military junta known as Derg went to power through the political slogans “land
to the tiller” and “Ethiopia First”. In 1975 the Derg regime implemented a radical project
of land nationalisation that phased out the Imperial landed classes, and provided for the
redistribution of the land through the newly established Peasant Associations. While for a
few years the redistribution satisfied the needs of a land hungry peasantry, particularly
in the lowland periphery of the country, the adoption of a rigid socialist economic model
generated a new set of problems soon after (Clapham, 1988). The 1975 land reform had
far-reaching consequences  on the political  and socio-economic relations in Ethiopian
rural areas. Beside the socialisation of agricultural practices, it mandated that producer
and service cooperatives to be set-up, the suppression of free market and private trade,
and made space for Agricultural  Marketing Corporations (Jemma, 2001).  Whereas the
economic  impacts  of  the  reform  were  disastrous,  with  declining  productivity  and
increasing food shortages, from a political point of view the territorialisation of state rule
in the rural milieu reached levels never experimented before. Since then, the Peasant
Associations—later on known as kebele—became intimately tied to the party structure and
a comprehensive system of political and socio-economic control of the rural areas was
established throughout the country. 
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26 In the 1980s and 1990s land redistribution was a main aspect of the territorialisation of
state  rule  through the  ethno-nationalist  revolutionary  movements—most  notably  the
TPLF—in the  liberated  areas  of  Ethiopia  from the  Derg.  The  TPLF  implemented  land
redistribution in the areas that progressively went under its control,  replacing Derg’s
cadres with new officials loyal to the liberation movement. 
27 In  post-revolutionary  Ethiopia,  land  policies  have  been  reshaped  according  to  the
deconcentrated architecture of the Federal Republic. The 1994 Ethiopian Constitution,
and the 1997 Land Law, empowers the National Regional States with the bulk of land
administration prerogatives. In the 1990s the policy document guiding the government
approach to rural development was the Agriculture Development-Led Industrialization
Strategy  (ADLI).  Under  ADLI,  state  support  to  smallholder  agriculture  is  aimed  at
achieving the objective of national food self-sufficiency, which in the long run would also
create the conditions for other sectors of the economy, particularly industry, to develop.
Land policy is also a central aspect of the programme of decentralization implemented by
the EPRDF since the 1990s. In the 1990s the implementation of decentralization entailed
the  territorialisation  of  state  rule  towards  ethnically  defined  entities,  reflecting  the
government priority of establishing or “giving a shape” to Ethnic Federalism. In the 2000s
decentralization focused on the deconcentration of prerogatives and resources to the
local administrative structures, through the so-called wereda-level decentralization. It is
in this context—and after a turbulent political phase that saw in 2001 the purge of the
TPLF’s  “left-wing” and in 2005 the most controversial  elections in the history of  the
country (Lefort, 2007)—that the 2005 Land Law provides for further deconcentration of
prerogatives on land administration to the local administrative structures of the wereda 
and kebele, and establishes the conditions for a strategy of agricultural commercialisation
that in the 1990s the EPRDF saw with scepticism.
28 The policy document outlining the new strategy for agricultural commercialisation is the
2010 GTP. In covering the years between 2010 and 2014, the GTP is the third poverty
reduction strategy paper adopted by the government of Ethiopia after the Sustainable
Development and Poverty Reduction Program (2002-2005) and the Plan for Accelerated
and Sustained Development to End Poverty (2005-2010). Under the GTP the “agricultural
strategy will direct on placing major effort to support the intensification of marketable
farm products -both for domestic and export markets, and by small and large farmers”
(GTP,  2010,  p. 8).  Large-scale  commercial  agriculture  and  commercialization  of
smallholder farming are equally supported, as the latter “will continue to be the major
source of agricultural growth” (GTP, 2010,  p. 8).  Agricultural commercialisation is the
main political  priority  for  fast  rural  transformation,  and towards  making  Ethiopia  a
middle-income country by 2025. Achieving food security through the direct support of
the smallholder sector becomes a secondary, although not marginal, priority. Since the
end of the 1990s another important pillar of the strategy for commercialisation is the
Rural Land Registration Programme.
29 These reforms reflect  a land policy framed around three main priorities.  The first  is
commercialised agriculture by successful smallholders, some of whom manage to actually
accumulate land through sharecropping, renting, and/or direct support. Second, large-
scale commercial agriculture by means of involving the private sector is promoted on
what the government defines as “unused land”. While the notion of “unused land” is
largely constructed, “Land Banks” have been established at both Federal and Regional
levels. Districts are required to provide a list of the “unused” land suitable for large-scale
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commercial agriculture, and then the Regional and Federal governments are in charge for
allocation to private (foreign and domestic) investors and stipulate leases accordingly.
The third priority is constituted by less successful farmers, whom are mainly targeted
through food security initiatives.  Agricultural  extensions to these areas are provided
through  the  Food  Security  Programme  (FSP),  which  is  composed  of  four  main
components: the Productive Safety-Net Programme (PSNP); the Household Asset Building
Programme  (HABP);  the  Complementary  Community  Investment  (CCI);  and  the
Resettlement component.
30 The  strategy  for  agricultural  commercialisation  is  nonetheless  framed  differently  in
different  regions,  revealing  the  tensions  and contradictions  inherent  to  the  ongoing
process  of  state  formation.  In  the  country’s  “highland  centre”  and  to  some  extent
“highland periphery”, where smallholders constitute the main power base of the ruling
party – and where the post-revolutionary narrative remains a meaningful legitimating
discourse -  the land policy is  mainly driven by the first  and third priorities.7 In the
“lowland periphery”, where the state apparatus is less consolidated and often actively
challenged – these regions having being incorporated in the ethnic federal  structure
mainly through a “passive revolution” - the government priority is mainly encouraging
large-scale  commercial  agriculture  by  means  of  involving  foreign  and  local  private
investors (Makki, 2012). 
31 Contemporary agrarian transformations in Ethiopia reflect a dynamic of “glocalisation”
to the extent that agricultural commercialisation is implemented by means of rescaling
normative arrangements at supra-national level—through the selective involvement of
global capital in large-scale commercialisation—as well as downwards to regions, wereda,
and kebele—through the support to commercialised smallholders. The peculiarity of the
Ethiopian case is that the land policy—and in the context of this article the agenda for
commercialisation—is intimately connected to the project of state building, as it reflects
the  attempt  of  the  ruling  elite  to  institutionalise  its  power  by  means  of  the
territorialisation of state rule in the rural milieu, and by an increasing involvement of
global capital. In this paper we characterise this sequence as a Thermidorian situation,
whereby  in  the  eyes  of  the  ruling  elite  sustaining  fast  agricultural  growth  through
commercialisation is the only viable solution to sustain the country’s transformation in
the long run. This reflects a fluid dynamic of post-socialist transition. Yet, the changing
agenda for rural development from national food self-sufficiency to commercialisation
shows that in the Ethiopian Thermidor, the ruling elite has not only an exclusive interest
in preserving the power acquired during the revolution. Rather, political and historical
conditions make the elite active in designing radical projects of rural transformation in
order to fulfil the expectations raised by the revolutionary process. This is not without
tensions and contradictions. The most important one, in the context of this paper, is the
ambiguity of  the project  of  rural  transformation vis-à-vis the question of  land.  While
maintaining a system of state ownership that guarantees the ruling party with greater
leverage  over  land  allocation,  resource  distribution  and  control  of  the  countryside,
agricultural commercialisation is underpinned by a project of social engineering with
clear political  objectives.  This reflects an on-going dynamic of state formation to the
extent  that  the  negotiation  of  land  and  local  resources  becomes  central  to  the
constitution of citizenship in the rural areas. Yet, the rural space is fluid and constantly
re-constructed by means of opposing, and often contradictory, normative frameworks.
Liberal  concerns  about  strengthening  tenure  security  and  sustaining  market
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development by means of involving the private sector, intervene into a context where the
state, and particularly the local administrative structures, has increasing powers over
land and resources allocation. People negotiate the rural space by trying to validate their
claims to land and natural  resources through these overlapping,  although sometimes
incompatible, normative systems and, depending on their relative position vis-à-vis the
local power, elaborate, challenge or contest the political project behind it.
 
Conclusion 
32 The  Thermidorian  paradigm  points  at  the  need  to  understand  the  significance  of
contemporary processes of rescaling and glocalisation linked to agrarian transformations
and  the  shift  towards  agriculture  commercialization  in  light  of  the  specificities  of
Ethiopia’s  post-revolutionary  historical  trajectory.  On  the  other  side,  the  notion  of
glocalisation recalls the need to situate the analysis of the Thermidorian situation within
the  specificities  of  different  Ethiopian  regions  and  peripheries,  where  the  post-
revolutionary  narrative  enjoys  different  degree  of  political  legitimacy  and  popular
support.  Taking  into  account  both  historical  and geographical  specificities  allows  to
highlight  the  central  role  that  agrarian  transformations  and land  issues  play  in  the
process of state formation in Ethopia, influencing the asymmetrical power relationships
between different scales, social and ethnic groups in the country.
33 The Ethiopian Thermidor results from the overlapping of two different revolutions, the
one of  the Derg and the one of  TPLF,  both addressing these  issues  with similar  and
diverging  answers.  Thus,  this  overlapping  entails  both  elements  of  continuity  and
rupture between the two regimes in the reconfiguration of the rural space, through land
management, agricultural policies and institutions like farmers’ cooperatives.
34 In contemporary post-revolutionary Ethiopia, the solutions offered by the Thermidorian
elite  to  these  issues  are  marked  by  a  shift  towards  economic  liberalisation  and
agricultural commercialisation. In theory, these policies imply a process of glocalisation
in two directions: i) by opening for foreign investments in land and agriculture, especially
in  the  country’s  periphery,  where  the  reach  of  the  state  is  less  comprehensive  and
smallholders do not constitute EPRDF main constituency; ii) by encouraging at local level
farmers  cooperatives  and Micro  and small  enterprises,  oriented  towards  agricultural
commercialization.  However,  in  the  practice,  these  processes  of  glocalisation  do  not
entail the loosing of influence and power by the central state in favor of global or local
actors. On the contrary, in the name of the developmental state, these policies involve a
reconfiguration of the government intervention in rural areas and the agricultural sector,
resulting  in  an  even  stronger  influence  of  the  state.  This  is  achieved  trough  the
reactivation of rural institutions inherited from the previous regimes like cooperatives,
the control of allegedly neutral and technical ones like MFIs or the promotion of new
“neoliberal” ones, such as micro and small enterprises.
35 The tension between these  two aspects  of  the  same agrarian  policy  stems  from the
inherent  contradiction  featuring  the  economic  liberalisation  under  the  Ethiopian
Thermidor. On one side, the Thermidorian elite aspires at transforming Ethiopia into a
“mature capitalist system”, promoting economic liberalisation, adopting market oriented
logics and acknowledging the role of the private sector. The material results of these
endeavours  are  tangible  in  terms  of  structural  economic transformation  and  social
diversification.  On  the  other  side,  the  impact  of  these  changes  does  not  seem fully
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acknowledged by the oligarchy leading the EPRDF.  The revolutionary ethos that  still
inspires them fails to fully recognize “the independecy and inertia of society” (Bayart,
2008),  impling  a  role  for  the  ruling  party  and  the  developmental  state  as  political
vanguard that should orient, lead and encadre the population and control the country
resources towards the achievement of the desired developmental outcomes. Economic
endeavours by private “glocal” actors are therefore accepted and supported as long as
they fit in this schema and do not emerge as potential competitors to the government.
36 In the fast growing and “emerging” Ethiopia, economic considerations seem therefore
subordinated to political and ideology imperatives. Thus, economic liberalisation under
the Ethiopian Thermidor nurtures increasing aspirations on development,  wealth and
upgrade mobility by the population. At the same time, it compels citizens to comply with
the decisions taken by an expanding state  apparatus in order  to see their  claims to
resources  validated.  This  schizophrenia  casts  shadows  on  the  effectiveness  and
sustainability of EPRDF economic policies, and ultimately on the political legitimacy of
this development project, if we acknowledge its main ideologue, the late PM Meles: “I am
convinced that we will  cease to exist  as a nation unless we grow fast  and share our
growth”.8
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NOTES
1. In  2001  an  internal  and rather  obscure  conflict  between the  oligarchy of  former  fighters
leading  the  TPLF  led  to  the  purge  of  the  most  radical  and  left-wing  component  and  to  the
consolidation of power within the inner circle of the Prime Minister and TPLF chairman Meles
Zenawi (Taddesse and Young, 2003). In the political “renewal” that followed that event, EPRDF
officially  inspired its  economic  policies  to  the  emulation of  the  Asian “developmental  state”
model, with an increased orientation towards market economy and the transformation of the
country in a mature capitalist system.
2. The TPLF and the EPLF were allied in the armed struggle against the Derg, in the name of the
autonomy of the bordering regions of Tigray and Eritrea. At the time, the latter was a province of
Ethiopia and seceded at the end of the civil war, becoming an independent state in 1993. The
EPLF became Eritrea’s ruling party, following a “thermidorian” trajectory parallel to the one of
the TPLF (Pool, 2001). The legacy of the ambiguous relations between the two fronts during the
armed struggle, and their unsolved ideological and personal disputes, were among the factors
fuelling the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1999-2001 (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000).
3. Microfinance  was  first  regulated  by  the  Proclamation  No.  40/1996,  which  provided
microfinance institutions to be regulated by the National Bank of Ethiopia and to be owned by
Ethiopian  nationals  only.  The  proclamation  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  Association  of
Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions (AEMFI) in 1999.
4. The three main MFIs are the Amhara Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI), the Dedebit Credit
and  Saving  Institution  (DECSI)  [Tigray],  and  the  Oromia  Credit  and  Savings  Share  Company
(OCSSCO), altogether accounting for 74 % of the market share in terms of loan provision (Deribie
et al., 2013).
5. Cooperatives in Ethiopia were first introduced in the 1960s during the Imperial period through
two  consecutive  decrees,  the  Farm  Workers’  Cooperative  Decree  No.  44/1960,  and  the
“Cooperative  Societies  Proclamation  No.  241/1966”.  However,  their  function  as  a  political
instrument  to  mobilize  the  peasantry  has  to  be  contextualised  in  the  reform  of  the  local
administrative  structures  during  the  Derg (Proclamation  No.  138/1978),  when  the  forced
formation of  producer cooperatives was implemented side by side with the establishment of
Peasant  Associations.  In  1998  the  EPRDF-led  government  enacted  the  Cooperative  Society
Proclamation No. 147/1998, which is the framework legislation ruling the cooperative system
today, and providing for four cooperative levels: primary cooperatives, unions, federations, and a
national cooperative league. While the organization of primary cooperatives varies from region
to region, they normally serve one or several kebeles, whereas unions serve multiple weredas or
an agricultural zone.
6. In West Arsi there is no evidence of agricultural MSEs until 2010. 
7. Markakis  (2011,  p. 12-15)  categorises centre-periphery relations  by distinguishing between
'highland centre', 'highland periphery', and 'lowland periphery'.
8. Quoted in De Waal (2013).
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RÉSUMÉS
L’article analyse les récentes politiques foncières mises en place par le gouvernement Éthiopien
pour promouvoir la commercialisation agricole, dans la perspective de la trajectoire historique
de formation de l’État  Éthiopien et  à  partir  du paradigme des « situations thermidoriennes »
développé  par  Jean-François  Bayart.  L’idée  d’un  Thermidor  Éthiopien  éclaircit  les  stratégies
originales  et  sélectives  de  libéralisation  politique  et  économique  adoptées  par  une  élite
postrévolutionnaire  qui  cherche  à  consolider  son  pouvoir  à  l’époque  de  la  globalisation
néolibérale. 
Les contradictions de ces stratégies pour ce qui concerne le foncier sont approfondies à travers
l’étude des réformes de modernisation agricole, des coopératives agricoles, des institutions des
micro-finances et des micro et petites entreprises agricoles dans la zone de West Arsi (région
Oromia).  Ces  transformations  agricoles  sont  caractérisées  par  une  dynamiques  sélective  et
incomplète de libéralisation, au nom du developmental state, et demeurent au cœur du processus
de formation de l’État Éthiopien contemporain, à travers des processus de (re)configuration et
(re)négociation des espaces et du pouvoir.
The article contributes to the debate about the historical trajectory of state formation in Ethiopia
and, by employing the notion of Thermidorian Situation as developed by Bayart, discusses some
recent shifts in the land policy towards agricultural commercialization. The Ethiopian Thermidor
sheds  light  on  the  extent  to  which  post-revolutionary  elites  since  the  1990s  have  adopted
selective  and  original  strategies  of  political  and  economic  liberalization  to  consolidate  their
power  in  the  context  of  neoliberal  globalization.  The  article’s  main  argument—that
contemporary agrarian policies in Ethiopia are inherently contradictory—is elucidated through
empirical  details  on  recent  reforms  of  agricultural  extensions,  cooperatives,  micro-finance
institutions (MFIs), and agricultural micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in the case study of West
Arsi Zone (Oromia Region). The article concludes that the current agrarian transformation in
Ethiopia,  characterized  by  selective  and  incomplete  dynamics  of  liberalization  under  the
developmental state, remains by far central to the overall process of state formation and can be
best described through unfolding patterns of (re)configuration and (re)negotiation of spaces and
power.
INDEX
Mots-clés : Éthiopie, formation de l’État, agriculture, terre, élites postrévolutionnaires
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